



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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CENTRAL AMERICA:

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the cogoverning Christian Democrats are stepping up verbal attacks on National Republican Alliance leader D'Aubuisson. In Guatemala, conciliatory gestures by rightwing leader Sandoval signals the end of resistance to the election of General Guevara.//

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Christian Democratic Concerns

//The Christian Democrats have publicly accused the ultraconservative National Republican Alliance of creating an electoral climate of hatred and have insinuated that party leader D'Aubuisson was involved in the assassination of popular Archbishop Romero in 1980. In a recent communique, they likened D'Aubuisson to Hitler and Mussolini.//

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Comment: //The Christian Democrats are worried that law-and-order themes and promises of a swift victory over the insurgents have given D'Aubuisson's party electoral momentum. By raising the Romero assassination, they hope to put him on the defensive on the issue of domestic violence.//

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The Christian Democrats--to remain in power and to preserve some of their reform programs--would likely consider a postelection coalition but only with more moderate rightist elements. They now apparently see D'Aubuisson as their major political challenger and continue to suspect that elements in the generally conservative officer corps will abet his electoral effort.

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Postelection Tensions Ease in Guatemala

Rightwing leader Sandoval's party has ceased its opposition to General Guevara's election and indicated a willingness to participate in the government. Sandoval may leave the country for a month or so to allow tensions to abate. [REDACTED]

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Comment: These conciliatory gestures signal the end of resistance to Guevara. Although the President-elect is unlikely to grant a significant role to Sandoval, the longtime nemesis of the Army high command, he may offer government posts to some of Sandoval's followers. [REDACTED]

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Nicaragua Announces Emergency Decree

The Nicaraguan Government issued a decree yesterday suspending citizens' "rights and guarantees" for a minimum of thirty days. Junta coordinator Daniel Ortega cited the "aggressive plans" of the US in justifying the action and implied that the recent sabotage of two bridges near the Honduran border had US backing. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The measure reflects mounting Sandinista fears about US-sponsored pressure and will offer the regime new opportunities to restrict the activities of domestic moderates. [REDACTED]

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POLAND: Restless Youth

The Jaruzelski regime has had only marginal success intimidating young Poles and expects them to continue to commit acts of defiance. [redacted]

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Young people comprised most of a crowd of several hundred at a demonstration Saturday in Poznan to mark the end of the third month of martial law. Students also apparently took the lead in earlier protest demonstrations at Poznan and Gdansk. [redacted]

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[redacted]

US Embassy officers who recently toured major universities report that students largely ignore the martial law regulations making class attendance mandatory and prohibiting unauthorized gatherings on campus. Meanwhile, a senior Polish prelate has expressed fear that the students' naive contempt for the authorities will make them easy prey for provocations by party hardliners. [redacted]

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Comment: The regime has avoided using heavyhanded measures with the universities out of concern for creating martyrs that risk putting it in even less favorable light. The police on Saturday handled the demonstration in Poznan without the great show of force that was used in an earlier incident. The authorities will continue their efforts to keep student organizers off balance by selective expulsions and other forms of intimidation, and by threatening to revoke still existing academic reforms.

[redacted]

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INTERNATIONAL: Nuclear Proliferation

//Several developing countries probably will acquire uranium enrichment technology during the 1980s. thus increasing the threat of nuclear proliferation.// []

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//Plutonium production formerly was the most accessible path to a nuclear weapons capability, but enriched uranium can now be produced by a variety of technically feasible and economically supportable processes. Countries currently employing uranium enrichment processes or known to be seeking enrichment technology include Japan, Australia, India, Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and Libya.// []

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//Several incentives other than possible interest in nuclear weapons will encourage developing countries to start enrichment programs. Many want nuclear power programs for prestige or to reduce their dependence on foreign oil. Some are reluctant to remain dependent on the US or other foreign suppliers for enrichment of uranium for reactor fuel over the 30-year lifetime of a nuclear power reactor.// []

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Comment: //Factors that have discouraged the spread of enrichment technology will be less effective in the 1980s. Denial of technology will become less effective than when only a few countries controlled gaseous diffusion technology, and when alternate methods of enrichment were only in the research stage.// []

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//Enrichment processes now available can be adapted to small production units that are less costly to construct than plants using the gaseous diffusion process. Moreover, the cost of producing enriched uranium for reactor fuel is only a fraction of the overall cost of nuclear power, and many countries may consider security of supply the overriding factor.// []

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USSR-CHINA: Prospects for Trade Talks

The annual talks, which are to open in Beijing soon, probably will result in agreement on at least some increase over the \$200 million total trade exchanged last year. The Chinese indicate that there probably will be an increase in trade but insist that it will not denote any weakening of their anti-Soviet policy. The Soviets, however, are claiming that a Chinese proposal for a large increase is a positive sign for Sino-Soviet relations. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Bilateral trade is unlikely to be significantly higher this year than \$500 million, the average during the late 1970s. The level will partly depend on Soviet willingness to sell timber and chemicals or Chinese willingness to pay in hard currency. [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR: Capability To Project Power by Air

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The progress being made by the Soviets' Military Transport Aviation force gives them a growing capability to move substantial military forces long distances. As the IL-76 continues to replace the aging AN-12 transport, movement of a force as large as an air-borne division is becoming increasingly practical. The need for overflight clearances, lack of an aerial refueling capability, and the limited ranges of most military transports, however, remain serious constraints.

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In the early 1970s, the force was not capable of moving large units long distances. The bulk of the transport force--720 of 770 aircraft--was made up of AN-12s, which have an operational range of 2,000 nautical miles when carrying military units.

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By the mid-1970s, the force had acquired a fleet of 58 long-range AN-22 aircraft, which are capable of carrying bulky, heavy loads. Although the AN-22 was an important addition, the small number of these aircraft was not sufficient for large-scale, long-distance movements.

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The IL-76, the transport force's first fanjet aircraft, began to replace the AN-12 in 1974. It has twice the maximum payload of the AN-12 and reduces the number of flights required to move military units by about 40 percent. The IL-76's high fuel consumption and lack of an aerial refueling capability, however, limit its useful range for moving large military units to about 3,000 nautical miles.

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The AN-22s and the IL-76s now comprise about one-third of the transport force's inventory but account for more than half of its lift capability. By 1985, these aircraft will make up about one-half of the force and account for approximately three-fourths of its lift capability.

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New Capabilities

This growing inventory of larger aircraft enables the Soviets to transport a more heavily equipped airborne division with increased firepower and ground mobility. They have fully mechanized most of their airborne divisions, with armored combat vehicles for all infantry companies, additional assault guns and field artillery, and twice the motor transport of the airborne division of the mid-1970s. Moving such a division by air was not practical before the addition of the IL-76. [redacted]

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The air transport force has played an important role in supporting the Soviet presence in the Third World. Moscow's involvement in Third World conflicts has increased from military assistance programs, to occasional use of Soviet combat forces in defensive roles, to extensive use of Cuban combat forces. [redacted]

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Most materiel sent to client states has been delivered by ship, but urgently required items have been transported by military aircraft bearing false Aeroflot markings. In December 1979, the Soviets flew airborne units to Afghanistan to gain control of Kabul and carry out the coup that installed a pro-Soviet government. [redacted]

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The transport force can fly the assault elements of a mechanized airborne division, including all of the division's combat equipment, approximately 2,500 nautical miles in a single lift and land it. Under favorable conditions, it could, if unopposed, transport an entire mechanized airborne division to Syria in a few days to a week, to Aden in two to three weeks, or to Mozambique in four to six weeks. Such an operation would require about 600 to 700 flights. [redacted]

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Constraints and Limitations

The Military Transport Aviation force has demonstrated its capability to conduct large-scale, medium-range movements and modest long-range operations. A long-range movement of a large military force, such as an entire mechanized airborne division to Aden or Mozambique, would, however, involve more complex operations. [redacted]

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Acquisition of overflight clearances and landing and refueling sites would be essential and will remain the most serious uncertainty for any external operation by the Soviets. The lack of aerial refueling would necessitate stops after 2,000 to 3,000 nautical miles. [REDACTED]

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Other potentially serious limitations are the capacity of airfields and the availability of sufficient quantities of fuel in the Third World. Any large-scale operation to most potential destinations in the Third World would require special arrangements for resupply of fuel at the destination and at intermediate stops. [REDACTED]

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The transport force will not realize its full potential for long-range operations without a higher ratio of crews to aircraft. The current number of crews, moreover, could sustain a large operation for only a short period. [REDACTED]

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DIA Comment

DIA concurs that the continual improvement of Military Transport Aviation capabilities is making the transport of airborne forces over long distances an increasingly practical option. DIA believes, however, that, for the general conditions mentioned in the article, the useful range of the IL-76 is approximately 5,000 nautical miles. Such a capability would reduce the deployment time of an entire airborne division to Syria by about one day, to Aden by about two to four days, and to Mozambique by as much as one week. Insertion of smaller airborne elements could take place much earlier. [REDACTED]

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